Four years ago, Will Wilkinson, stated:
… So, I will powerfully counter-assert: a theory of human nature is NOT supposed to be normative. Take that Richard Rorty! A theory of human nature, or at least a theory of homo sapiens is supposed to tell us what we are like and how we got to be that way. Such theories need tell us no more about what we ought to be like than the theory of the big bang need tell us what the universe ought to be.
Science can tell us a lot about the space of possibility, however. And because ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, there is a straightforward link from the descriptive to the normative. Because a theory of human nature can tell us a lot about what we can’t do, and what won’t work, we can learn a lot about what we shouldn’t do.
I would go further than Will in bowing before the alter of science, but will elaborate on that later….
The problem is that “utility” has little utility as a basis for common agreement, for what is useful to one person is not useful to another. Labor camps may not have worked for the prisoners, but they worked very well for Stalin’s purposes. Abortion doesn’t work well for the unborn, but very well for people who do not want to be burdened with children. Euthanizing the elderly isn’t so great for the elderly themselves, but works well for HMOs and younger generations who wish the old folks would go away. The liberal welfare state works poorly for the middle class, but works great for those who receive checks and those who have guaranteed jobs running government bureaucracies.
The very fact that something is happening at all means that it can be done and that it works for someone. There is no point in arguing against what we can’t do, because what we can’t do takes care of itself. There is no need for laws against being in two different places at the same time.
The political is the art of the possible, of choosing from among things that can be done, those that should be done. And for that we need a basis for distinguishing ends that goes beyond mere utility.
The problem is that “utility” has little utility as a basis for common agreement, for what is useful to one person is not useful to another. Labor camps may not have worked for the prisoners, but they worked very well for Stalin’s purposes. Abortion doesn’t work well for the unborn, but very well for people who do not want to be burdened with children. Euthanizing the elderly isn’t so great for the elderly themselves, but works well for HMOs and younger generations who wish the old folks would go away. The liberal welfare state works poorly for the middle class, but works great for those who receive checks and those who have guaranteed jobs running government bureaucracies.
So many unstated assumptions which most people would disagree with that there’s really no response needed except that: You’re wrong. Try not to talk as if everyone agrees with all your assumptions, OK? (if you want a response at least)
The political is the art of the possible, of choosing from among things that can be done, those that should be done.
There are many categories. Qualitative binning removes information as to the quantitative cost of each cost alone, as well as the combinations of costs an benefits.
And for that we need a basis for distinguishing ends that goes beyond mere utility.
This is agreed. But these are generally guided by utility. And in the end, everything is natural (how’s that for assumptions?).
I think this overlooks your namesake’s point: it is not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger.
A theory of human nature can tell us which causes of action would lead to, say, more murders being committed. It can’t tell us that we should prefer fewer murders over more murders, or how important that preference is compared to other goals.
In particular, the idea that we shouldn’t attempt a plan that will fail is reasonable, but it’s a normative idea, not an empirical one.
Sorry, that should be “courses of action”, not “causes”.
it is not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger.
Reason is overrated. Emotion has it on the leash 🙂
It can’t tell us that we should prefer fewer murders over more murders, or how important that preference is compared to other goals.
Nope. Though back to the point this weblog: I don’t think that ultimate philosophical logic counts as much as case-by-case positions.
Again, I don’t think reason is the ultimate ground of morality. It’s our emotions, which derive from nature.
Pray tell, how do you bow deeper before the altar of science? My sense is that we believe the same thing, more or less. But I disagree, as a matter of science, that our emotions “derive from nature,” and such that “nature” provides the ground for a sentimentalist morality. Our emotional capacities derive from nature, but the expression of emotion is subject to emotional evaluation, and these evaluations differ in different places and times. Which is to say, norms about emotional expression are variable and culturally mediated. “Nature” does not dictate the best norms of feeling. Moreover, the way our emotions are calibrated is to some extent up to us. That’s why we have “culture wars.” I argue that a “liberal” calibration of moral emotion is most likely to lead to health, happiness, longevity, etc. Whether I’m right is of course an empirical question, and I’m anxious for better science so that we can better settle the matter. Of course, these aren’t rationally mandatory aims, but you’re a monster if you reject them.
Hummm. Isn’t it quite a bit more complicated than that? I agree that our instinctive emotions have a strong genetic component, but they evolved in response to an environment that no longer exists. For example, we have an instinctive fear of snakes ( indeed, even a piece of rope on the ground can make us jump ), though many folks never encounter a snake their whole lives. On the other hand, we have no such instinctive fear of, say, a massive object hurling past us on the road at 60 miles an hour, sometimes missing us by a foot or two. The latter is a MUCH more dangerous situation, but was non-existent when our “emotions” were formed. Same thing with riding in a plane.
Mr. Hume,
I appreciate your kind response and I will do my best to do better. I’m not sure what unstated assumptions you are referring to. I made a series of assertions (e.g. “abortion does not work well for the unborn”) with which you may disagree, but I’m not aware of any unstated assumptions behind it, other than common sense ones (e.g. abortions actually happen, and destroy rather than foster the life of the unborn.)
Since you ask, “Everything is natural” is a fine assumption. What interests me about assumptions is not whether I agree with them, but how they are used to develop an argument. In your next comment, you write:
“It’s our emotions, which derive from nature.”
This is a true statement but seems a trival and unenlightening one in light of your assumption that everything is natural, since the tag “which derive from nature” is universally applicable, including to reason, religious rites, science, pseudoscience, kite flying, bowling tournaments and Communist dictatorships. How does pointing out that a predicate universally applied also applies to emotions advance your argument?
Since we seem to have gotten off on the wrong foot, let me say this: I think I know what you are getting at and I more or less agree. Although I am a Catholic, I think a strictly secular conservatism is possible and indeed welcome. Much of the leftwing agenda is empty because it simply won’t work, and science is useful in showing that.
You may have had the same experience I have had, which is giving reasoned demonstrations to liberals that they can’t refute, but that somehow have no effect on them. I show them that their program won’t “work” but they don’t seem to care. The reason, I think, is that “work” means something different for them than it does for me. Liberal anti-poverty programs aren’t really about helping the poor but making liberals feel better and creating government jobs for their friends, and they “work” pretty well at that. That’s what I meant about the Stalin comment… as far as Stalin was concerned, labor camps worked fine even if you and I know them to be economic as well as moral disasters, and that’s because Stalin’s definition of “work” is made strictly in terms of his personal grip on power.
My point is that before we apply the utilitarian logic, the meaning of what “works” has to be sorted out, because people only do something if it “works” in some sense of the term – usually for their own benefit at the expense of others. And the meaning of “works” is really a philosophical rather than a scientific question.
Pray tell, how do you bow deeper before the altar of science? My sense is that we believe the same thing, more or less.
I think that the set of natural biases which I take as the grounds for a moral system are more inclusive than yours. As a self-described liberal I think you emphasize a smaller set of our natural biases as privileged over the larger set. But yes, on in an ultimate sense what I said earlier was incoherent or unfair. I’ll elaborate in future postings, but it’s like you’re C# and I’m an Assembly language….
Of course, these aren’t rationally mandatory aims, but you’re a monster if you reject them.
Give me some leave too…LOL.
I made a series of assertions (e.g. “abortion does not work well for the unborn”) with which you may disagree
e.g., whether the unborn are persons are in dispute. It seems better just to bring up issues where it isn’t controversial to illustrate points.
How does pointing out that a predicate universally applied also applies to emotions advance your argument?
Here is what I’m getting at: living and human society is art, not logic. A lot of the moral philosophizing is exploring verbal logic, but I think verbal logic is pretty sloppy (I mean, most of the weblog comments don’t resemble Frege from what I can see), and over a sequence of 10 interlinked propositions you can also get to where you really want to get to. Therefore, I think it is better to just admit that most of this reasoning is cognitive window dressing, and stay “close to the code” of our emotions, which are true validators of our moral sense.
I’ll write about this more later. Perhaps I’m incoherent, so I invite criticism. Will’s comment fleshes out some of the issues which I’m trying to grapple with…I’m not a philosophical thinker myself, so it doesn’t come naturally to me, and I’m clumsy. I hope to make up for that in terms of my relatively “thick” grounding in biological sciences.
Hume,
I was careful not to say that the unborn were persons because it is controversial. I just said they were unborn. Abortion doesn’t work for the unborn whether they are persons or not, just as stepping on a bug doesn’t work for the bug even if bugs are not persons.
We agree that living and human society is art, but I see art as primarily a rational enterprise, not an emotional one. In any case, I don’t see why something can’t be both rational and emotional at the same time, e.g. the feeling of joy on finally understanding calculus.
I’m still confused about why you hold that emotions are true validators of moral sense. Is it because emotions are derived from nature? But so is reason, on the assumption that everything is natural. Yes, reason can be twisted to get to where you really want to go, but emotions are equally open to manipulation. In fact, it is through reason that we can become aware that our emotions are being twisted, but there isn’t any emotion that immediately indicates an error in logic. At least, I know I have made plenty of logical errors while feeling nothing in particular. This would seem to give reason a claim to the title of true validator, wouldn’t it?
In any case, I don’t see why something can’t be both rational and emotional at the same time, e.g. the feeling of joy on finally understanding calculus.
Yes. But how that plays out, and how it is apportioned in decision making, varies from person to person.
I’m still confused about why you hold that emotions are true validators of moral sense
I hold that quite often emotion is closer to our “cognitive code.” Also, I think tend privilege the communal emotional sensibility, since many humans are deviant.
But my general position is somewhat inchoate in this format…as I need to be much clearer an more precise. Keep reading. I doubt you’ll agree with what I post, but I think you’ll see how we disagree with more clarity.
Hume,
I’ll keep reading and thanks for the conversation…
All the best,
David